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I.

INTRODUCTION

Two commercial airliners cruised with the accuracy of guided missiles
into the Twin Towers of New York's World Trade Center. A third took out
a wing of the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. So it was on September 11,
2001 that the nation's attention shifted to obvious questions: How could
such a tragedy have occurred? How can we ensure that it never happens
again?
As American troops boarded planes and ships bound for
Afghanistan, Congressional response on the home front came swiftly in the
form of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (the "Act").' Passed
by both houses on November 19, 2001, the Act amends various sections of
Title 49 of the United States Code, and several other titles to provide for
enhanced security in America's airports.2 The Act sets forth a detailed
scheme under which the federal government will exert greater control than
t Molly Selzer is a third year student at the University of Pennsylvania Law School
and currently serves as Editor-in-Chief of that institution's Journal of Labor and
Employment Law.
1. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.; 5 U.S.C. §§ 5313, 8331; 26 U.S.C. § 9502; 31
U.S.C. § 1105). Because of the many different locations within the United States Code
where the Act is codified, for the remainder of the comment, sections referred to will be
those in the session laws, unless otherwise specified. In other words, the Act itself will be
referenced, not the various titles and chapters of the U.S.C. which the Act amends.
2. Although the majority of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act amends Title
49, dealing with the responsibilities of the Department of Transportation, other titles are also
amended by the Act. These include: Title 5, which deals, generally, with government
organization and employees; Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and Title 31,
regarding presidential budget submissions.
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ever before over airport security operations, and creates a new federal
workforce to implement that scheme.
The federalization of airport security workers is a unique event for
several reasons. While the private sector frequently complains about
government regulation of industry, it is not often that the United States,
safe haven of capitalism and the free market economy, commandeers a
private industry. It is perhaps for this reason that one of the biggest debates
concerning passage of the Act centered on whether or not airport security
personnel should be made federal employees.
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the only other instance in
modem American history which resembles such a mass federalization was
also in an airport-related business, that of air traffic control, during
President Reagan's standoff with the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization (PATCO) in the 1980s.3 Although the air traffic controllers
were already federal employees at the time of their infamous strike, they
had exercised a good deal of power and autonomy as a unit. This level of
autonomy, quite comparable to that of any strong private sector union, was
eviscerated by the Reagan administration's clamp-down on union activities,
and eventual discharge and replacement of almost 11,000 strikers.4
Because of its novelty and its unique effect upon union autonomy, the
federalization of a whole sector of private industry as a method of coping
with a national emergency bears close scrutiny. It implicates the collective
rights of these new federal workers, as well as the future shape of
American labor law.
This Comment will lay out the legislative history and basic provisions
of the new Act, with special attention to those sections federalizing airport
security personnel, and creating guidelines for their hiring and training.
With that groundwork established, the Comment will explore from a labor
law perspective some of the possible ramifications of the Act's provisions
providing for the federalization of an entire workforce. Such discussion
will focus on the special status of federal employees with regard to the
exercise of their collective action rights.5
The remainder of the Comment will address some Title VII concerns
that may arise as a result of the new hiring guidelines for airport personnel
delineated in the Act, and the current political and social climate with
3. See generally Bernard D. Meltzer & Cass R. Sunstein, Public Employee Strikes,
Executive Discretion, and the Air Traffic Controllers, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 731 (1983)
(relating the history and legal implications of the PATCO strike of 1981).
4. Id. at 746-47 (describing the former willingness of PATCO workers to engage in
slow-downs, despite their status as federal employees without the right to strike, and the
power of such union activity to affect the air travel industry).
5. By way of prelude, federal workers, while they may join together to form unions,
may not, under Title V of the United States Code, go on strike. See 5 U.S.C. § 731](3)-(4)
(2001).
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regard to Arab and Muslim Americans. History has shown that in times of
war, discriminatory treatment of a feared ethnic group tends to run amok.6
The secret military tribunals currently being employed to try individuals
associated with the terrorist acts of September 11, for example, raise
serious constitutional concerns for individual liberty under the Fourth, Fifth
and Sixth Amendments. 7 Although these concerns reach beyond the scope
of an article meant to deal primarily with labor law issues, a limited
assessment of the potential for discrimination in the hiring of Arab and
Muslim Americans as federal employees seems squarely within the scope
of such an article, and will be discussed below.
II.

To FEDERALIZE OR NOT TO FEDERALIZE?:

LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT
AND THE BIRTH OF THE AVIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY

ACT
The first bill to be introduced in Congress regarding airport security
after September 11 was introduced by Senator Edwards just three days after
the attacks.8 The bill to "provide for the improvement of security at
airports and seaports" was rather short, made no mention of federalizing
security personnel, and was referred to the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 9 That bill died in Committee and
was succeeded by the Senate bill introduced by Senator Johnson on
September 26th.' ° Senate Bill 1473 called for immediate federalization of
airport security personnel, and did so prominently in the first section of the
bill." H.R. 3110, the bill favored by House Democrats on October 12, also
mandated that federal employees carry out all screening of passengers and
luggage.' 2 The competing bill sponsored by House Republicans sought
federal oversight of the screening process, but not the creation of a new
federal workforce. Under that bill, "[a]ll screening of passengers and
property at airports... [would] be supervised by uniformed Federal
personnel of the Transportation Security Administration who shall have the
power to 3order the dismissal of any individual performing such
screening."
6. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the United States
government's internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War).
7. See Joseph Margulies, A Year and Holding: Limbo is No Place to Detain Them,
WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2002, at B I (describing the imprisonment of "unlawful belligerents"
from Pakistan and Afghanistan in Guantdnamo Bay, Cuba).
8. S. 1429, 107th Cong. (2001).
9. Id.
10. S. 1473, 107th Cong. (2001).
11. Id.at § 1(a).
12. H.R. 3110, 107th Cong., sec. 4, § 44901(b) (2001).
13. H.R. 3150, 107th Cong. sec. 3, § 44901(e) (2001) (emphasis added).
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In the next section, just under the provision outlining federal
supervision of security screening, the House Republican bill included a
segment marked "Limitation on Right to Strike": 14 "An individual that
screens passengers or property, or both, at an airport under this section may
not participate in a strike, or assert the right to strike, against the person
(including a governmental entity) employing such individual to perform
such screening."' 5 The version of this section that survived in the final Act
will be considered and discussed below. For the moment, however, it is
important to note the inherent tension between the bill's insistence that
private employees perform security screening, and its simultaneous refusal
to allow these employees the right to strike.
The rights of private employees to go on strike have been protected by
the National Labor Relations Act since its passage in 1935.16 In conceding
to federalization, House Republicans secured the bonus of an anti-striking
provision not specifically included in either the original Senate or House
Democrat bills; the provision is now codified in Section 11 (i) of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act." The inclusion of such a
provision is curious in that it is entirely superfluous. Without it, the new
federal employees would have been prohibited from striking anyway.
Under Title 5, their status as federal employees alone would be sufficient to
impose upon them the duty not to go on strike. 8 The United States Code
provisions, governing the terms of employment for all federal employees,
state under the heading of "Loyalty and striking":
An individual may not accept or hold a position in the
Government of the United States or the government of the
District of Columbia if he ...(3) participates in a strike, or
asserts the right to strike, against the Government of the United
States or the government of the District of Columbia; or (4) is a
member of an organization of employees of the Government of
the United States or of individuals employed by the government
of the District of Columbia that he knows asserts the right to
strike against the Government of the United States or the
government of the District of Columbia. 9
It seems that a key factor in the decision to federalize airport security
14. Id. at § 44901(f).
15. Id.
16. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)).
17. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, sec. 111 (i), 115 Stat.
597, 619 (2001).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 7311(3)-(4) (2001).
19. Id. See also, Air Trans. Ass'n of Am. v. PATCO, 516 F. Supp. 1108, 1110
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (emphasizing that "strikes by federal employees continue to be illegal ....
and indeed criminal," behavior).
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personnel -- one that was not emphasized in the media coverage of the
debate over federalization - was the knowledge that doing so would
prevent such employees from striking, a prohibition that may have obvious
safety benefits for the millions of Americans who will depend on the new
screeners for secure travel, but may also have less obvious economic
ramifications.
When the Professional Air Traffic Controllers went on strike in
violation of their no-strike duty as federal employees under Title 5 in 1981,
they inflicted, in the words of Professors Bernard Meltzer and Cass
Sunstein, "substantial losses on the airlines and the community at large. 2 °
The threat of crippling financial losses and safety concerns spurred strict
enforcement of Title 5 against PATCO in 1981, and though
unacknowledged publicly, could have spurred the inclusion of the no-strike
clause in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. 21 Bearing this
political and legislative history in mind, the provisions of the new Act take
on added meaning. It is an Act not solely concerned with providing for our
safety, but in its efforts to short-circuit any future labor crisis before it
starts, it deprives airport workers of the right to strike. 22
III. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: AN OUTLINE OF THE AVIATION AND
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ACT

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act is divided into two
titles: Title I: Aviation Security, and Title II: Liability Limitation.2' Title
II, far shorter than the first title and largely beyond the reach of this
Comment, covers the financial liability of various parties affected by the
terrorist attacks of September 11.24
Title I, which provides the focus for this Comment, establishes a new
federal agency under the Department of Transportation, the Transportation
Security Administration, 25 to be headed by the Under Secretary of
Transportation for Security.26 Appointed by the President "with the advice
and consent of the Senate, 27 the Under Secretary's functions include the
research and development of civil aviation security, as well as security
responsibilities over other modes of transportation currently under the

20.
21.
22.
23.
(2001).
24.
25.
26.
27.

Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 747.
Act, supra note 16.
Id.
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
Id. sec. 201, 115 Stat. at 645-47.
Id. sec. 101(a), § 114(a), 115 Stat. at 597.
Id. sec. 101(a), § 114(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 597.
Id.
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regulatory authority of the Department of Transportation 2
This means
that along with airports, the Under Secretary is responsible for the safety of
passengers on highways, trains, buses, ports and waterways.2
On Monday, December 10, 2001, President George W. Bush
nominated veteran law enforcement officer John W. Magaw for the new
post of Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. 30 Magaw took over
as director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms after that
bureau received criticism for its handling of the assault on the Branch
Davidian compound in Waco, Texas in 1993. 3' In that capacity, Magaw
headed investigations into the Oklahoma City bombing, the 1996 crash of32
TWA flight 800, and the 1996 bombing at the Atlanta summer Olympics.
In July of 2002, however, Magaw was forced to resign, due to mounting
concerns over his lack of experience in the field of aviation.33 Retired Adm.
James M. Loy, former commandant of the Coast Guard and the number
two official at the Transportation Security Administration, was named to
replace Magaw.34 Concerns continue to escalate over how the replacement
will affect the TSA's ability to fulfill the mandates of the Act on time,
when efforts 5 to meet Congress's timetable have already been largely
3
unsuccessful.
Loy reports directly to the Transportation Security Oversight Board,
which is charged with the responsibility of reviewing and ratifying all
regulations and security directives issued by Loy.36 The Board, established
under section 102 of the Act, is comprised of seven members and will be
chaired by the Secretary of Transportation.37 Other members include the
United States Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Treasury, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or
alternatively, a designee sent by each of the four above members. 38 The
Board will also contain one member appointed by the President to represent
the National Security Council, and one to represent to Office of Homeland
security, currently headed by former Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge.3 9
28. Id. sec. 101(a), § 1l4(d)(1)-(2), 115 Stat. at 597.
29. Ellen Nakashima, Bush Picks TransportationSecurity Chief, WASH. POST, Dec. 11,
2001, at A31.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Greg Schneider, Magaw Ousted From Airport Security Post, WASH. POST, July 19,
2002, at Al.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, sec. 102(a), §
115(c)(1), 115 Stat. 597, 605 (2001).
37. Id. sec. 102(a), § 115(a)-(b), 115 Stat. at 604-05.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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As a component of his responsibility for day-to-day passenger
screening operations, Loy has a number of duties which make him
instrumental in creating the new federal workforce of airport security
personnel. The Under Secretary must "develop standards for the hiring and
retention of security screening personnel" and must also "train and test"
them. n0 These duties will be discussed below in more depth. Also part of
his duties and powers, he shall require background checks for airport
security screeners, as well as all other individuals with access to secure
areas of airports.4' It is not yet clear exactly which workers, other than
security screeners, will now receive background checks, but baggage
handlers, pilots, flight attendants and airport and airline management seem
like obvious candidates. While not technically federal employees, these
adjunct classes of workers will now be under closer federal supervision.
Section 138 of the Act, entitled "Employment Investigations and
Restrictions, ''42 mandates new background checks for these individuals,43
including employees hired long before September 11. 44 Checks will
include "a criminal history record check and a review of available law
enforcement data bases and records of other governmental
and international
45
agencies" should the Under Secretary see fit.
Security screeners and the Under Secretary are not the only new
federal workers created by the Act. To help Loy in his duties, each U.S.
airport will now have a Federal Security Manager, appointed by the Under
Secretary to oversee screening of passengers and property at his or her
airport.46
The Act provides the Security Managers and the Under Secretary with
several additional tools, aside from testing, training and background checks
of workers, to aide in the protection of America's airports. The Under
Secretary can, upon the consent of the Attorney General, deploy federal
law enforcement personnel to any airport. 4 ' The Act also authorizes the use
of "biometric or other technology that positively verifies the identity of
each employee and law enforcement officer who enters a secure area of an
airport.' '44 To prevent employees and non-employees alike from hampering
the screeners in their work, the Act contains amendments to the United
States criminal code making interference with security screening personnel

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.

101(a), § 1 14(e)(1)-(4), 115 Stat. at 597-98.
101(a), § 114(f)(12), 115 Stat. at 598.
138.
138(a)(8), § 44936(a)(1)(C)(i), 115 Stat. at 639.
138(a)(10), 115 Stat. at 640.
138(a)(8), § 44936(a)(1)(C)(i) 115 Stat. at 639.
103, § 44933(a)-(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 605.
106(a), § 44903(h)(3), 115 Stat. at 608.
106(a), § 44903(h)(4)(E), 115 Stat. at 609.
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a crime punishable by fine, imprisonment up to ten years, or both.49 If the
individual "use[s] a dangerous weapon in committing the assault or
interference, [he] may be imprisoned for any term of years or life
imprisonment."5 °
As for in-flight concerns, Loy may deploy Federal air marshals "on
every passenger flight of air carriers in air transportation or intrastate air
transportation. '"' The Act also authorizes improved flight deck integrity
measures, such as the strengthening of flight deck doors and the use of
video monitors to alert pilots to activity in the cabin.52
All of these measures, the necessity and practicality of which remain
to be seen, will likely be expensive. The federal government must now pay
for the "[s]alary, benefits, overtime, retirement and other costs of screening
personnel, their supervisors and managers, and Federal law enforcement
personnel deployed at airport[s],"53 as well as for the costs of training, the
costs of background checks, and the costs of research and development of
new security technology.54 Congress has provided that "the... costs of
providing civil aviation security services" be paid for via "security service"
fees imposed uniformly on all passengers whose flights originate in the
United States. 55 The Under Secretary can also impose fees on air carriers,
to make up for any deficiencies in funds from the passenger fees. 56
Passengers and air carriers with grievances about these new fees will have
no recourse to the courts; Loy's ability to impose these fees and to
determine the cost of implementation of all programs under his control will
not be subject to judicial review."
Eventually, some economic relief to fee bearers may be had in the
form of limited subcontracting of security screening. The Act contains
58
provisions allowing for limited subcontracting, during a two year time
period, 59 by the government to private screening companies, owned by U.S.
citizens, whose employees must meet all the same qualifications as the
federal employees. 6 0 However, the subcontracting can only take place after
security has been run by the federal government for at least one year, and
then only upon application by an airport that must be approved by the

49. Id. sec. 114(a), § 46503, 115 Stat. at 623.
50. Id.

51. Id. sec. 105(a), § 44917(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 607.
52. Id. sec. 104(a)(1)(B); 104(b)(1), 115 Stat. at 606.

53. Id. sec. 118(a), § 44940(a)(1)(A), 115 Stat. at 625.
54. Id. sec. 118(a), § 44940(a)(1)(A)-(G), 115 Stat. at 625.

55. Id. sec. 118(a), § 44940(a)(1), 115 Stat. at 625.
56. Id. sec. 118(a), § 44940(a)(2)(A), 115 Stat. at 625.

57. Id. sec. 118(a), § 44940(a)(1)-(a)(2)(A), 115 Stat. at 625.
58. Id. sec. 108(a), § 44919(a), 115 Stat. at 611.
59. Id. sec. 108(a), § 44919(b), 115 Stat. at 611.
60. Id. sec. 108(a), § 44919(f)-(g), 115 Stat. at 611-612.
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Under Secretary.6'
To breed cooperation among all employees working in areas related to
the new federal agency, Congress included a whistleblower provision under
section 125 of the Act, entitled "Encouraging Airline Employees to Report
Suspicious Activities. 62 The provision states that no private employee of
an air carrier, either foreign or national,
who makes a voluntary disclosure of any suspicious transaction
relevant to a possible violation of law or regulation, relating to air
piracy, a threat to aircraft or passenger safety, or terrorism... to
any employee or agent of the Department of Transportation, the
Department of Justice, any Federal, State, or local law
enforcement officer, or any airport or airline security officer shall
not be civilly liable to any person under any [state or federal
laws] for such disclosure.63
IV. TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT OF SECURITY SCREENING PERSONNEL
AS DEFINED BY THE ACT: SOME BROADLY APPLICABLE CIVIL RIGHTS
IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, THE ADA, AND TITLE VII

Section 11 1 of the Act, "Training and Employment of Security
Screening Personnel," 64 makes clear that the Under Secretary must
"establish a program for the hiring and training of security screening
personnel., 65 As of December 19, 2001, thirty days after the Act became
law, the Under Secretary was required to "establish qualification standards
for individuals to be hired by the United States as security screening
personnel. 66 Loy has fairly broad discretion in determining what
characteristics will ensure an able workforce, but the Act does give him
some mandatory minimum standards. The new workers must score
satisfactorily on a Federal security screening personnel selection
6
examination, 67 which the Under Secretary must draft.68
Moreover, the
69
screeners must be U.S. citizens and must "have the ability to demonstrate
daily a fitness for duty without any impairment due to illegal drugs, sleep
deprivation, medication, or alcohol., 70 All screeners and baggage handlers
will be subject to background checks, which will include a criminal history
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.
Id. sec.

108(a), § 44919(b)-(c), 115 Stat. at 611.
125(a), § 44941(a), 115 Stat. at 631.
111 115 Stat. at 616.
11 (a)(2), § 44935(e)(1), 115 Stat. at 616.
11 1(a)(2), § 44935(e)(2)(A), 115 Stat. at 616.
11 (a)(2), § 44935(e)(2)(A)(i), 115 Stat. at 617.
111 (a)(2), § 44935(e)(3), 115 Stat. at 617.
11 (a)(2), § 44935(e)(2)(A)(ii), 115 Stat. at 617.
11 l(a)(2), § 44935(e)(2)(A)(v), 115 Stat. at 617.
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record, and review of all available law enforcement databases. 7' Applicants
for the screening position must also meet a separate host of employment
standards in order to obtain and retain their job.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, presumably including
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII")72 and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the "ADA"),73 the screeners must be able to
perform a variety of physical and mental tasks.74 Congress has mandated
that, regardless of whatever other requirements Loy and his agency choose
to impose, the federal screeners must possess "basic aptitudes and physical
abilities, including color perception, visual and aural acuity, physical
coordination, and motor skills . . . .,,7 The Act goes on to state in detail the
skills which Congress finds necessary for various components of a
screener's daily duties. In effect, Congress has preordained a series of
bona fide occupational qualifications for the screeners instead of leaving
the skills required more loosely defined, thereby allowing individuals with
a disability or for whom English is not their first language to challenge the
necessity of a certain characteristic in state or federal court under the ADA
or Title VII. For example, people who are visually impaired, even solely
color blind, may not qualify for the position, given the language in sections
11 (f)(1)(B)(i) and (ii). Those sections require that screeners be able to
"distinguish on the screening equipment monitor the appropriate imaging
standard specified by the Under Secretary, 76 and "be able to distinguish
each color displayed on every type of screening equipment and explain
what each color signifies. 77
Hearing impaired applicants will also be
disqualified if they are unable to "hear and respond to the spoken voice and
to audible alarms generated by screening equipment in an active checkpoint
environment., 78 People with other physical disabilities may be disqualified
under section 11 1(f)(1)(B)(iv), which requires that persons performing
physical searches "or other related operations ... be able to efficiently and
thoroughly manipulate and handle such baggage, containers, and other
objects subject to security processing., 79 The subsection immediately
following mandates that screeners who perform pat-downs have "sufficient

71. Id. sec. 138(a)(1), § 44936(a)(1)(A), 115 Stat. at 639.
72. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-2 (2001).
73. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, 29 U.S.C. §
706 (1990).
74. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, sec. 11 l(a)(2), § 44935(f)(1), 115 Stat. at
617.
75. Id. sec. Ill(a)(2), § 44935(f)(1)(B), 115 Stat. at 617.
76. Id. § 44935(f)(1)(B)(i), 115 Stat. at 617.
77. Id. § 44935(f)(1)(B)(ii), 115 Stat. at 617.
78. Id. § 44935(f)(1)(B)(iii), 115 Stat. at 617.
79. Id. § 44935(f)(1)(B)(iv), 115 Stat. at 618.

2003]

AIRPORT SECURITY WORKERS

dexterity and capability"8 ° to conduct that procedure. Section 11 1(f)(1)(C)
of the Act sets forth a number of reading, writing, and speaking-related
tasks, all of which screeners must be able to perform in English.81
The above training and hiring requirements represent perfectly
reasonable, common-sense standards. My purpose in describing them in
such detail is not to indicate that Congress was somehow unreasonable or
intentionally discriminatory in fixing those standards. After all, being able
to operate the screening equipment efficiently and effectively in the hectic
atmosphere of an airport where travelers are frequently rushing to make
flights seems like the bare minimum we should expect of any screener.
Furthermore, emergency situations warranting clear and speedy
communication amongst security personnel obviously do not lend
themselves to the use of an interpreter, no matter how noble the goal of a
diverse work force may be. The English language qualifications set forth
by Congress, if subjected to scrutiny in the courts under Title Vil's
provisions prohibiting discrimination in employment based upon national
origin, would certainly pass as a bona fide occupational qualification.82 In
fact, Title VII gives special deference in terms of framing employment
qualifications to employers whose employees are charged with protecting
national security: Title VII, section 2000e-2(g) makes it clear that when the
subject of employment is related to national security, it is not an unlawful
employment practice for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire and employ
any individual for any position, [or] for an employer to discharge any
individual from any position"83 if the employee has failed to meet a
requirement "imposed in the interest of the national security of the United
States under any security program in effect pursuant to or administered
under any statute of the United States ....84

It is also more than likely that a court would find making
accommodations for hearing and visually impaired employees unduly
burdensome to the government under the ADA, and would not require such
accommodations to be made, given the demands of the job, and its
importance to national security.
What Congress has done, however, in specifically stating that the
screeners' job qualifications must hold fast "[n]otwithstanding any
provision of law,"85 is to prevent individuals from ever bringing a challenge
under the ADA or Title VII in the first place, despite the fact that such a

80. Id. § 44935(f)(1)(B)(v), 115 Stat. at 618.
81. Id. § 44935(f)(I)(c)(i)-(iv), 115 Stat. at 618.
82. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).

83. Id. § 2 000e-2(g).
84. Id. § 2000e-2(g)(1).

85. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, sec. 11 l(a)(2)(f), §
44935(f)(1), 115 Stat. 597, 617 (2001).
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challenge probably has a greater likelihood of failing than succeeding. As
private employees, baggage screeners would have had the right to
challenge, through the appropriate channels, any job requirement that they
found discriminatory. As federal employees, they have been stripped of
this right. It seems counterintuitive for Congress to pass laws protecting
the civil rights of American citizens, and then to fail to extend those rights
to persons employed by the United States. While the loss of the chance to
bring a lawsuit which may well fail seems, on the surface, not to be much
of a loss at all, it constitutes a deprivation of due process. Equal access to
the courts is a fundamental right of every U.S. citizen granted in the federal
Constitution under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.86
As alluded to in the Introduction to this Comment, personal liberties
are frequently
subjugated to the interests of national security in times of
87
war.
The appropriate balancing of priorities in such situations is a
difficult task, and one which I do not envy the legislators in undertaking.
However, when that task has been accomplished, and the balance has been
tipped in opposition to individual liberties, it is vital that the move not go
unnoticed. Few, if any, of the articles published in the nation's leading
newspapers during the five months after September 11 mentioned the
deprivation of rights of workers which would necessarily flow from the
classification of screeners as federal, rather than private, employees.88
The history of labor law in this country has shown that where its own
employees are concerned, the federal government has been willing to
deprive workers of rights they would be guaranteed under federal law in
the private sector. Indeed, strikes by air traffic controllers who happen to
work for the government are a criminal offense, while equally disruptive
strikes by privately employed airline pilots are protected by law.89 It is in
this larger historical context that the fights of federal screeners under the
Act can best be understood, and it is to this history which I now turn.

86. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
87. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the United States
government's internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War).
88. In researching this comment, I ran daily Lexis and Westlaw searches of national and
international newspapers, and magazines specializing in the airline industry. My search
turned up articles relevant to the Act in the following publications: Airline Industry
Information, Aviation Week & Space Technology, the Boston Globe, Business Recorder,
the Dallas Morning News, the Denver Post, the Detroit Free Press, the Houston Chronicle,
the New Jersey Record, the New York Times, the Philadelphia Inquirer, Traffic World, the
Washington Post, the Washington Times, the Weekly of Business Aviation, and World
Airport Week. I found no article referring to the airport employees' loss of their right to
strike.
89. See Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 734-35.
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FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND THE NOT-SO-SACROSANCT RIGHT TO
STRIKE

Numerous labor law scholars have noted that the right to strike,
whether enjoyed by public sector or private employees, has been steadily
on the decline for at least the past twenty years. In fact, many argue that
the decline started long before that.90 According to one scholar:
When the [NLRA] was enacted in 1935, Congress enabled
employees to bargain collectively by providing an unabridged
right to strike. As part of this change in public policy, Congress
sought to reduce the role of courts in labor disputes. Until then,
employers had relied on judges to issue injunctions against
strikers and their leaders, enforceable by fines and
imprisonment ....[W]hen Congress provided a right to strike in
the NLRA, it carefully chose language to forewarn courts not to
interfere in labor disputes. Sixty-five years later, the right to
strike is a shadow of what Congress intended. 91
Several theories have been advanced to explain the weakened status of
the strike. One theory is that the declining right to strike results from the
tactics of employers who provoke strikes as a means of severing bargaining
relationships with unions. 92 This theory holds that strategic union
avoidance is the root of the declining right to strike. Proponents of this
theory argue that, beginning in the 1960s, employers started to defy the
NLRA in order to prevent employees from participating in union
activities.93 Others suggest that the Supreme Court's decision in Mackay
Radio v. NLRB, 94 in which the Court held that employers have a right to
hire permanent replacements for striking employees,9 5 was the turning point
in a losing battle for the strike right. A corollary to the Mackay theory, and
one which will receive a good bit of attention here because of its focus
specifically on the rights of federal employees, is known as the "PATCO
thesis." This line of analysis suggests that President Reagan's response to
90. Id. at 731-32 (discussing the far reaching effects of the PATCO strike of 1981). See
generally John J.Murphy, Striking in the FederalSector: An Update of the Law, 35 AM. U.
L. REv. 929 (1986) (reviewing decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit); Michael H. Leroy & John H. Johnson IV, Death by Lethal Injunction:
National Emergency Strikes Under the Taft-Hartley Act and the Moribund Right to Strike,
43 ARIZ. L. REv. 63 (2001) (exploring the decline of workers' collective action rights over
the past sixty-five years).
91. See Leroy & Johnson, supra note 90, at 63-65.
92. Id. at 67.
93. See Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L.
REv. 255, 261 (1990) (explaining that the roots of today's troublesome labor relations began
in the 1960s).
94. Mackay Radio v. NLRB, 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
95. See Leroy & Johnson, supra note 90, at 66.
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the crippling 1981 strike of over 11,000 air traffic controllers by hiring
permanent federal replacement workers for all strikers caused lasting ripple
effects. The theory suggests that Reagan's actions firmly solidified the
legal stance against strikes by federal workers and was pivotal in bringing
about a more general decline in workers' ability to strike. The "PATCO
thesis" has come under recent criticism, 96 but has been advanced by noted
scholars such as Cass Sunstein.97
In an article co-written just two years after the PATCO strike,
Sunstein prognosticated that "[u]nquestionably, the PATCO affair ended in
victory for the federal antistrike policy." 98 Prior to the PATCO strike and
subsequent Reagan administration crackdown, many factors worked
together to make the blanket proscription on strikes by federal employees a
relatively toothless statute. Public doubts about the wisdom of forbidding
strikes by all federal employees, combined with "fear of political and
economic reprisals from unions and other opponents of antistrike laws,"
had nearly "eviscerate[d] enforcement of the proscription. Enforcement
had, in fact, been so lax and erratic"9... as to approach a de facto
recognition of 'illegal' public employee strikes as a regular part of the
negotiating process."' 0 0
VI. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PATCO STRIKE, AND THE REAGAN
ADMINISTRATION'S SOLUTION

During the time period between its formation in 1968 and its infamous
strike in 1981, the air traffic controllers' union known as PATCO had
consistently showed "a willingness to resort to self-help, in the form of
slow-downs and strikes, to remedy its stated grievances." 0 ' The union
engaged in these activities regularly despite the existing Title V
proscriptions against striking by federal employees. Meltzer and Sunstein
note five key historical points which explain and give context to the
union's brazen disregard for Title V in 1981:
First, the criminal law was apparently not invoked against
offenders. Second, the executive branch did not maintain that
federal employees engaging in 'strikes' would be ineligible for
continued employment in their regular jobs; indeed the
administrative sanctions against PATCO and against individual
controllers were relatively mild. Third, such sanctions were

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 69 (calling the PATCO thesis "facile and unrealistic").
See Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 794-99.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 732.
Id.
Id. at 746.
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followed by progressively stronger and more overt union
pressures. Fourth, PATCO's job actions, though falling far short
of a full stoppage, demonstrated its capacity to inflict substantial
losses on the airlines and the community at large. Finally, the
unlawful conduct of air traffic controllers produced not only
prospective injunctions and contempt actions against PATCO,
but also judicial admonitions concerning both PATCO's duty to
obey the 0antistrike
law and the Attorney General's duty to
2
enforce it.
During the period immediately preceding the 1981 strike, tensions ran
high between the management of Chicago's O'Hare Airport and the air
traffic controllers. In order to bolster its position, PATCO employed a
strategy involving two contradictory prongs. The union simultaneously
built support amongst its rank-and-file for a strike and made assurances to
Congress that the union would obey Title V's antistrike law.' °3 This
strategy gained the union some ground in Congress, where bills were
proposed which would have incorporated many of the union's key demands
in the PATCO-FAA agreement which was up for renewal on March 15,
1991. 4 Tensions continued, however, and after repeated efforts at
negotiation failed to bring about ratification of an agreement acceptable to
the union, approximately 13,000 of the 16,400 controllers in the bargaining
unit went on strike on August 3, 1981.1°5
Presidential response was swift. Reagan gave the controllers fortyeight hours to return to work or face discharge, and approximately 1200
controllers did return to their jobs. 10 6 Public support for ensuing
injunctions sought by the Department of Transportation and the civil and
criminal sanctions threatened by the Justice Department was strong because
the American public, understandably, wanted to keep planes in the air.'0 7
Sentiment against the remaining strikers was equally strong. The strike,
based on demands for increased salary and improved working conditions,
appeared to many "to lack much moral content.. 10 8
Ultimately, Reagan replaced over 11,000 workers who refused to
come back to the job. The move sapped PATCO's strength as a union both
internally, and in the public eye, as "compassion for the strikers collided
directly with concern for both the safety and the sentiments of those
controllers who had faithfully discharged their responsibilities to the

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

746-47 (internal citations omitted).
749.
752.
757-58.
758.
761.
760.
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9
government during ...the 1981 strike."1
The lasting result of the strike and PATCO's unsuccessful courtroom
efforts to challenge the President's break, argue Meltzer and Sunstein, was
to solidify the federal courts' views on Presidential discretion and the
federal right to strike. Namely, post-1981 it was firmly established that the
antistrike statute is constitutional in view of concerns for the public's
safety, and that the President in his role as executive has wide discretion to
ensure compliance with that law. " °
Meltzer and Sunstein's views have been challenged recently by
professors Michael H. Leroy and John H. Johnson IV. Leroy and Johnson
assert that long before the PATCO strike, the "Taft-Hartley injunctions
seriously harmed several strong unions - most notably, those in the steel,
longshoring, and maritime industries."'11 Leroy and Johnson doubt that
"employers, in response to strikes think: 'If the President can [forbid
strikes] we can, too."', 1 12 They assert that an examination of the Bureau of
Labor Statistics main survey of large work stoppages shows that "the
downward trend in strike activity that is so often attributed to Reagan
actually began at the end of the period in which Taft-Hartley injunctions
'
In this regard, Leroy and Johnson note the sharp
were ordered."113
downward trend in strike activity which occurred in the years following
President
Carter's petition for a coal-strike injunction between 1977 and
4

1978.'

While Leroy and Johnson raise valid points, they also concede that
"the last Taft-Hartley injunction was issued early in 1978," and refer to
such injunctions as "mothballed labor policy.

'11 5

Given this admission,

their criticism of the PATCO thesis warrants some modification. It is my
contention that the PATCO affair does indeed have much of the
significance that Meltzer and Sunstein predicted it would have in 1983.
One need look no further than the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act's antistrike provision to bolster this contention. 1 6 Much like its
predecessor in the early House Republican Bill,' 17 the antistrike provision
in the current Act denies any individual "that screens passengers or

109. Id. at 771.
110. See ATA v. PATCO, 516 F. Supp. 1108 (EDNY, 1981), affd ATA v.PATCO,667

F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that air traffic controller strike injunctions have not been
found unconstitutional).
111. See Leroy & Johnson, supra note 90, at 69.
112. Id.
113. Id.at68.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71,
44935(a)(2)(i), 115 Stat. 597, 619 (2001).
117. H.R. 3150, 107th Cong. sec. 3, § 44901(f) (2001).

sec. 111(i), §
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property, or both, at an airport under this section" the right to "participate
in a strike, or assert the right to strike, against the person (including a
governmental entity) employing such individual to perform such
screening."' 8 Interestingly, the current provision is buried twenty-three
pages into the Act, unlike the prominent display it received in the very first
section of the early House Republican effort. Buried or not, it is
nonetheless effective. As stated earlier in this Comment, Title V of United
States Code prohibits all federal employees from striking under any
circumstance. 119 The duplicative nature of section 111(i) of the Act is quite
apparent, and, I believe, not accidental. In insisting that the antistrike
clause be included, House Republicans emphasized the currency of Title V,
and evidenced their concern for the financial stability of the nation, as well
as for the well-being of travelers. The devastating economic effects of the
PATCO strike alluded to by professors Sunstein and Meltzer 20 would be
even more disastrous in the wake of a national terrorist threat, and the
already wounded economy that has ensued from the September 11
attacks. 121
The PATCO thesis, therefore, must be viewed in the larger historical
context of competing and self-contradicting government efforts to protect
the rights of workers on the one hand, and protect the national security most notably, the nation's financial security - on the other. When viewed
in this context, we can readily see the new Aviation and Transportation
Security Act as a re-codification of this financial policy of the federal
government.
VII. TITLE VH CONCERNS: EXTRAORDINARY TIMES AND
DISCRIMINATORY MEASURES FOR ARAB AND MUSLIM AMERICANS?

Much of earlier portion of this Comment focused on the broadly
applicable constitutional, Title VII, and ADA concerns posed by the Act's
hiring and training requirements. I would now like to turn the discussion to
a more narrowly focused inquiry into special Title VII concerns relating to
Arab and Muslim Americans.
Even before the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks of
September 11, Arab and Muslim Americans faced a serious amount of
discrimination. A report published by the Council on American-Islamic
Relations Research Center in 2001 noted a 15% increase in the number of
118. Id.
119. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7311(3)-(4) (2001).
120. Meltzer & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 747 (noting PATCOS capacity to inflict
substantial losses on the airlines). ,
121. See Stephen Friedman, Right Plan at the Right Time, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2003, at
B7.(discussing President Bush's plan to boost the sluggish, post-September 11th economy).
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complaints of discrimination from Arab and Muslim Americans over the
previous year. 12 Encounters with bias, the report states, "took place in all
institutional settings of life.' ' 123 Complaints detailed discrimination, both
subtle and openly violent, based on national origin and religion in public
schools, public and private universities, and in the workplace.1 24 A recent
article published in the Fordham Law Review details government
retaliatory measures in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing, and their
25
continuing adverse effects on Muslim Americans. 1
Given this background, it would not be surprising if the broad
discretion, granted to the Under Secretary in Section 11 l(a)(2)(e)(C) of the
Act to disqualify applicants for the position of federal screeners who by no
existing standard pose a security risk, were frequently invoked to deny
Arab Americans employment. Under that section, the Under Secretary
must establish procedures -- procedures which Congress has not at all
circumscribed - in addition to criminal background checks "to ensure that
no individual who presents a threat to national security is employed as a
security screener.' ' 126 That section, read in conjunction with the general
notice that all training and hiring standards apply notwithstanding any other
provisions of law, 12 may leave innocent Americans of Middle Eastern
descent who feel that their Title VII rights have been violated with no legal
recourse. This would occur at just a time when discrimination against them
is likely to be a more significant obstacle than ever before. It seems to me
that little harm would result, and that the ends of justice would be much
better served, by allowing Title VII challenges to the hiring practices
established by the new Act.
Since the initial drafting of this comment, at least one member of the
federal judiciary agrees. On November 15, 2002, Judge Robert M.
Takasugi of the Central District of California issued a preliminary
injunction barring enforcement of the citizenship requirement in the
Aviation and Security Transportation Act.
Takasugi held that the
government defendants had not established "that the exclusion of all noncitizens is the least restrictive means to further the government interest in
improving aviation security.' 28
122. Mohammed Nimer, The Status of Muslim Civil Rights in the United States 2001:
Accommodating Diversity, Council on American-Islamic Relations (2001).
123. Id. at 2.
124. Id. at v, 5-8.
125. See generally Michael J. Whidden, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United
States AntiterrorismLegislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV.2825 (2001).
126. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-7 1, sec. 11 l(e)(2)(C), §
44935(e)(2)(C), 115 Stat. 597, 617 (2001).
127. Id. sec. 11 l(f)(1), § 44935(f)(1), 115 Stat. at 617.
128. Gebin v. Mineta, 2002 WL 31947889, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2002). See also
Sara Kehaulani Goo, Security Law Called Unconstitutional; Non-U.S. Citizens Win
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VIII.CONCLUSION

Compared to the serpentine manner in which the majority of bills
wind their lazy way through the national legislature, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act shot through Congress like a rocket. Surely,
this required tremendous effort, and reflects genuine concern for the
national well-being on the part of legislators, their staffs, and the President.
My criticisms and observations are meant only to remind readers that
especially in times of crisis, we should be mindful of the important role
civil liberties play in our personal lives, and in the life of our nation.
Workers' rights and the rights of minorities will always conflict with
majority pressures and capitalist values to some degree. The laws we have,
including the NLRA, Title VII, the ADA, and our Constitution, require that
we balance these competing interests in light of a fundamental respect for
the freedom of assembly, due process, and equal protection rights of
individuals. The provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act outlined and discussed above, as any statute passed hastily during a
time of national emergency, deserve special attention in this respect.

Screener Ruling, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at A12 (discussing the Mineta ruling and its

importance to the eighty percent of San Francisco screeners and forty percent of Los
Angeles screeners under the private-contractor system who are not U.S. citizens.

